As expected, the results support our first hypothesis: the framing effect exists and affects decision-making processes in humans. In our experiment, subjects responded significantly more often with sure options than with risky options when the scenario is framed as a gain. Alternately, subjects responded significantly more with risky options than with sure options when the scenario was framed as a loss. Our results represent a successful replication of multiple studies of the framing effect (Gonzales, et al., 2005; Kim, et al., 2005; Kuhberger, et al., 2002). A possible explanation for our results is the cognitive-affective tradeoff model proposed by Gonzales, et al. (2005): the cognitive effort required in the decision-making process and the feeling of pleasure elicited from the decision will affect what choice is made. For example, when subjects in our experiment read the scenarios and the answer choices, the risky option for gain-framed scenarios (disregarding payoff level) may have incurred greater cognitive processing or feelings of displeasure in the subjects, leading them to choose the sure choice. Gonzales and colleagues supported their model with brain imaging techniques; future replications of this experiment may also want to include fMRI scans to physiologically test the cognitive-affective tradeoff model as an explanation for results that ultimately support the framing effect. WCFL Informational Guide.

The results of our study also support our second hypothesis: people are less risky in scenarios involving high payoffs than they are in scenarios involving low payoffs. This is shown by subjects responding significantly more with sure-option responses in the high-payoff scenarios than in low-payoff scenarios. These results are congruent with previous findings; Kuhberger and colleagues (2002) report that for scenarios involving real payoffs, subjects more often chose the sure option when the payoff was high and the risky option often when the payoff was low. A reasonable explanation for this pattern is that in general, people are less likely to exhibit risky behavior when there is “more to lose.” Specifically, in our study, the thrill of choosing a risky option for Drumheller Duck, Superman, Spiderman, or a Martian colony may outweigh the confidence or pleasure elicited from choosing a sure option. For the scenarios in our questionnaire in which the decisions for the scenarios carried larger consequences, the sure option may have seemed more safe and appropriate. Because we only implemented hypothetical scenarios, our study suggests that Kuhberger, et al. (2002)’s results can be applied to scenarios like ours in which the consequences of the decisions are not actualized.