In the same section, Nietzsche conveys that within society, most valuations of morals are based on fear. He exemplifies this with the idea that there is “no morality of love to one’s neighbor” (Nietzsche 123), or that any altruistic act cannot really be measured on a moral-immoral basis, and all altruistic acts are made out of fright felt towards those who are being helped. This seems directly contradictory to Kropotkin’s idea of Mutual Aid, which states not only that those who support each other ultimately have the best chances for survival, but also that mutual aid occurs without authority and with deep roots of sociability and ethical conceptions (Barash 153-157). Kropotkin also states that we may be unaware of the extent to which Mutual Aid is carried out because of the over-emphasis of human struggle (Barash 154), and yet Nietzsche states that there really is “little constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual assistance…” (Nietzsche 123). It is rather difficult to find, between Nietzsche and Kropotkin, a common ground concerning the basis for kind acts towards our neighbor.

In “Our Virtues,” the seventh section of the book, Nietzsche offers his view on learning.

In “The Natural History of Morals,” the fifth part of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche discusses the function of dreams. “What we experience in dreams,” says Nietzsche, “provided we experience it often, pertains at last just as much to the general belongings of our soul has anything ‘actually’ experienced… even in the brightest moments of our waking life, we are ruled to some extent by our dreams” (Nietzsche 114). Though certainly not a psychoanalyst (especially when the field of psychology was in its infancy), Nietzsche’s thoughts on dreams can be compared well to Freud’s, which were to appear about 25 years later. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud provides a comprehensive commentary on the nature of dreams, the use of symbolization within them, their meaning, and their overall significance (Barash 110-113). To my knowledge, Freud did not get any specific idea from Nietzsche concerning dreams, so it’s well to see an unrelated concept about dreams that just as well could have been a precursor to Freudian theory.

In the second section, “The Free Spirit,” Nietzsche introduces the will as the only cause for any and every effect found in mankind, and he remarks that the most fundamental of all wills is the Will to Power (Nietzsche 52). The Will to Power is further described as a necessity of all life: “…if it be a living and not a dying organization… it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract itself and acquire ascendancy – now owing to any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is precisely Will to Power” (Nietzsche 226). While the quest for increasing power has been labeled a possible pervasive attribute of all humanity, it’s important to discern Nietzsche’s more personal idea of “power” from a Machiavellian approach, for example, that discerns power in terms of ruthlessness and relatively unfortunate necessity. While Machiavelli argues the need for power in politics, autocratic rule, and general social affairs (Barash 185-188), Nietzsche’s sense of power requires no conscious implementation. To him, it is simply a fact – the fact – of all human nature. Wind Turbine Project.

Nietzsche also criticizes Rene Descartes’ notion of “I think,” labeling it an “immediate certainty” that is ultimately misleading and falsifiable (Nietzsche 22-23). Descartes, in Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conduction the Reason and Seeking for Turth in the Sciences, remarked that, “I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that ‘I’ who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth ‘I think, therefore I am’ was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it…” (Barash 81). Nietzsche does dare to shake the notion by saying that there are a number of assumptions used in Descartes’ so-called truth. One of these assumptions is that I, the subject of the phrase, is actively conducting the thinking instead of the thinking spontaneously arriving to I. With this example, Nietzsche expresses the importance of not falling for a seemingly simple array of words (Nietzsche 24-25).

In the first part of Beyond Good and Evil, “Prejudices of Philosophers,” Nietzsche is careful to dissect the philosophies of important thinkers, two of whom being Immanuel Kant and René Descartes. Kant, an important figure in the German Enlightenment, believed that humans are equipped with “a priori” knowledge; not all knowledge held by humans acquired through or dependent upon experience (Barash 43). Nietzsche responded to Kant’s theory with the following: “’By means of a means (faculty)” – [Kant] had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that – an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question?” (Nietzsche 17-18). Nietzsche goes on to explain that though Kant cannot ideally support his idea of “a priori notions,” it is generally human nature to accept it anyways, and humans have the right to do so (Nietzsche 18).

There is no doubt that many have tackled the issue of human nature. Inquiring minds propose to themselves, and to others, questions such as: How did humanity begin? What is unique about humans? What is constant throughout humanity? What kinds of discrepancies are there within the human race? What ultimately shapes how humans think and behave? One of the more intriguing philosophers to tackle these questions, Friedrich Nietzsche, offered a glimpse of his view of human nature through Beyond Good and Evil, a collection of 296 aphorisms designed to provocatively convey his view of humanity, especially during its execution in nineteenth-century Europe. While he thoroughly and often vehemently expands upon categories in David Barash’s compilation Ideas of Human Nature, it is perhaps most intriguing to see both the similarities and complicated oppositions to many of the thinkers mentioned in Barash’s book.